Editing Anti-ballistic missile (section)

==Current counter-ICBM systems==
[[File:Arrow-3 Jan-03-2013 (c).jpg|thumb|Israel's [[Arrow 3]]]]
There are a limited number of systems worldwide that can intercept [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s:

* The Russian [[A-135 anti-ballistic missile system]] (upgraded in 2017 to A-235)<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=ARBATOV |first1=ALEXEY |last2=DVORKIN |first2=VLADIMIR |last3=TOPYCHKANOV |first3=PETR |last4=ZHAO |first4=TONG |last5=BIN |first5=LI |date=2017 |title=ENTANGLEMENT AS A NEW SECURITY THREAT: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE |journal=Entanglement |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26908.6 |pages=11–46}}</ref> is used for the defense of [[Moscow]]. It became operational in 1995 and was preceded by the [[A-35 anti-ballistic missile system]]. The system uses [[ABM-4 Gorgon|Gorgon]] and [[Gazelle (missile)|Gazelle]] missiles previously armed with [[nuclear warhead]]s. These missiles have been updated (2017) and use non-nuclear kinetic interceptors instead, to intercept any incoming ICBMs.<ref name=":2" />
* The Israeli [[Arrow 3]] system entered operational service in 2017. It is designed for exo-atmosphere interception of ballistic missiles during the [[spaceflight]] portion of their trajectory, including those of ICBMs.<ref name=is>[http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-successfully-tests-Davids-Slings-interceptor Israel successfully tests David's Sling's interceptor] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130509060922/http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-successfully-tests-Davids-Slings-interceptor |date=9 May 2013 }} By Yaakov Lappin. Jpost.com, 25 November 2012</ref> It may also act as an anti-satellite weapon.
* The American [[Ground-Based Midcourse Defense]] (GMD) system, formerly known as [[National Missile Defense]] (NMD), was first tested in 1997 and had its first successful intercept test in 1999. Instead of using an explosive charge, it launches a hit-to-kill [[kinetic projectile]] to intercept an ICBM. The current GMD system is intended to shield the United States mainland against a limited nuclear attack by a [[rogue state]] such as North Korea. GMD does not have the ability to protect against an all-out nuclear attack from Russia, as there are currently only 44 ground-based interceptors available to counter projectiles headed towards the US.<ref name="economist,0">{{Cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21734465-someone-ought-explain-commander-chief-there-no-guaranteed-defence |title=There is no guaranteed defence against ballistic missiles—yet |newspaper=The Economist |language=en |access-date=28 January 2018 |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/ |title=Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System |website=Missile Threat}}</ref> (This interceptor count does not include the THAAD, or Aegis, or Patriot defenses which provide shorter range defence against incoming projectiles.)
* The [[Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System|Aegis ballistic missile defense]]-equipped [[RIM-161 Standard Missile 3|SM-3 Block II-A]] missile demonstrated it can shoot down an ICBM target on 16 Nov 2020.<ref name= aegisSm3BlockIia >[https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2417334/us-successfully-conducts-sm-3-block-iia-intercept-test-against-an-intercontinen/ FTM-44 (17 Nov 2020) U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target] Flight Test Aegis Weapon System-44 (FTM-44). The [[C2BMC]] network detected an ICBM launch; U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS John Finn (DDG-113) then launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile which destroyed the ICBM in mid-course.</ref>
**In a November 2020 test, the US launched a surrogate ICBM from [[Kwajalein Atoll]] toward [[Hawaii]] in the general direction of the continental US, which triggered a [[C2BMC|satellite warning]] to a Colorado Air Force base.<ref name= ftm44 /> In response, {{USS|John Finn}} launched a missile which destroyed the surrogate ICBM, while still outside the atmosphere.<ref name= ftm44 >[https://web.archive.org/web/20201203121551/https://www.mda.mil/video/FTM44PostMissionVideo2.mp4  MDA (18 Nov 2020) FTM-44 mission overview] 20-MDA-10624 (Not to scale nor in real time)</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite news|last=Kluth|first=Andreas|date=2020-11-29|title=A Successful U.S. Missile Intercept Ends the Era of Nuclear Stability|language=en|work=Bloomberg.com|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-30/a-successful-u-s-missile-intercept-ends-the-era-of-nuclear-stability|access-date=2020-11-30}}</ref><!--
PLEASE place minor info, such as SAM missiles that potentially can have limited ABM capability, at the country sections located in further part of article; this part is for short summary of OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS that can shoot down INTERCONTINENTAL ballistic missiles. -->

===American plans for Central European site===
{{further|National missile defense#Recent developments}}
During 1993, a symposium was held by western European nations to discuss potential future ballistic missile defence programs. In the end, the council recommended deployment of early warning and surveillance systems as well as regionally controlled defence systems.<ref>Assembly of the [[Western European Union]]. Technological and Aerospace Committee. Lenzer. via FAS.[https://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/europe/weu_93/weu1363tasc.htm Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151015200451/http://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/europe/weu_93/weu1363tasc.htm |date=15 October 2015 }}. 17 May 1993.</ref>
During spring 2006 reports about negotiations between the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic were published.<ref name="MDA Intl Coop" />
The plans propose the installation of a latest generation ABM system with a radar site in the Czech Republic and the [[U.S. missile defense complex in Poland|launch site in Poland]].<ref name="MDA Intl Coop" /> The system was announced to be aimed against ICBMs from Iran and North Korea.<ref name="MDA Intl Coop" /> This caused harsh comments by Russian [[President of Russia|President]] [[Vladimir Putin]] at the [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] (OSCE) security conference during spring 2007 in Munich. Other European ministers commented that any change of strategic weapons should be negotiated on [[NATO]] level and not 'unilaterally' [sic, actually bilaterally] between the U.S. and other states (although most strategic arms reduction treaties were between the Soviet Union and U.S., not NATO). The German foreign minister [[Frank-Walter Steinmeier]], a Social Democrat, expressed severe concerns about the way in which the U.S. had conveyed its plans to its European partners and criticised the U.S. administration for not having consulted Russia prior to announcing its endeavours to deploy a new missile defence system in Central Europe.<ref>Gaspers, J. (2007). [https://web.archive.org/web/20080910223745/http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/content-ABM/Natolin_Analiza_7_2007.pdf A US Missile Defence Shield in Europe? Opinions and Arguments in the German Political Debate. Natolin Analyses 7(20)/2007].</ref> According to a July 2007 survey, a majority of Poles were opposed to hosting a component of the system in Poland.<ref name="wp_antimissile">{{cite news | language=pl | title=55% Polaków przeciw budowie tarczy (55% of Poles against building the Shield) | date=17 July 2007 | publisher=[[Polska Agencja Prasowa]] | url=http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wiadomosc.html?kat=1342&wid=9029388&ticaid=146b1 | access-date=7 September 2007 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120120062339/http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wiadomosc.html?kat=1342&wid=9029388&ticaid=146b1 | archive-date=20 January 2012 | url-status=live }}</ref>
By 28 July 2016 [[Missile Defense Agency]] planning and agreements<ref name="MDA Intl Coop">{{cite web|url=https://www.mda.mil/system/international_cooperation.html|title=MDA International cooperation|access-date=11 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170901154454/https://www.mda.mil/system/international_cooperation.html|archive-date=1 September 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> had clarified enough to give more details about the [[Aegis Ashore]] sites in Romania (2014) and Poland (2018).<ref name=aegisAshore>{{cite web|url=https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_ashore.pdf|title=(28 July 2016) Aegis Ashore|access-date=11 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011130348/https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_ashore.pdf|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>