Editing Action theory (philosophy) (section)

== Overview ==
Basic action theory typically describes [[action (philosophy)|action]] as intentional behavior caused by an ''agent'' in a particular ''situation''.<ref name="Funke">{{cite book |last1=Funke |first1=Joachim |editor-last1= Meusburger |editor-first1= P.  |editor-last2= Werlen |editor-first2= B.  |editor-last3= Suarsana |editor-first3= L. |title=Knowledge and Action |date=2017 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-319-44588-5 |pages=99–111 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-44588-5_6 |language=en |chapter=How Much Knowledge Is Necessary for Action? |series=Knowledge and Space |volume=9 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-44588-5_6 }}</ref> The agent's ''desires'' and ''beliefs'' (e.g. a person wanting a glass of water and believing that the clear liquid in the cup in front of them is water) lead to bodily behavior (e.g. reaching across for the glass). In the simple theory (see [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]), the desire and belief jointly cause the action. [[Michael Bratman]] has raised problems for such a view and argued that we should take the concept of intention as basic and not analyzable into beliefs and desires.

Aristotle held that a thorough explanation must give an account of both the [[efficient cause]], the agent, and the [[Telos|final cause]], the intention.

In some theories a desire plus a belief about the means of satisfying that desire are always what is behind an action. Agents aim, in acting, to maximize the satisfaction of their desires. Such a theory of prospective [[rationality]] underlies much of [[economics]] and other [[social science]]s within the more sophisticated framework of [[rational choice]]. However, many theories of action argue that rationality extends far beyond calculating the best means to achieve one's ends. For instance, a belief that I ought to do X, in some theories, can directly cause me to do X without my having to want to do X (i.e. have a desire to do X). Rationality, in such theories, also involves responding correctly to the reasons an agent perceives, not just acting on wants.

While action theorists generally employ the language of [[causality]] in their theories of what the nature of action is, the issue of what causal determination comes to has been central to controversies about the nature of [[free will]].

Conceptual discussions also revolve around a precise definition of [[Action (philosophy)|action]] in philosophy. Scholars may disagree on which bodily movements fall under this category, e.g. whether thinking should be analysed as action, and how complex actions involving several steps to be taken and diverse intended consequences are to be summarised or decomposed.